Video games are a kind of physical computation, and the point holds true of computation more generally. Computationalism about consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal properties supervene on computational ones – that is, that being the right kind of computer is enough to be conscious. The mechanism of action of inhalational anesthetics remains something of a scientific puzzle, especially given the ability of chemically inert gasses like xenon to remove consciousness at high concentrations. Tim Maudlin's work bears an important relationship to various 'exploding implementation' arguments, which claim that any sufficiently complex object can implement any finite-state automaton. Maudlin's argument does not require exploding implementation to be true, however. Indeed, he presupposes that appropriate counterfactual restrictions are sufficient to avoid explosions. Maudlin's argument, by contrast, reads computationalism more narrowly as the claim that some Turing machine can be conscious.