ABSTRACT

The collapse of communism was not the most favorable moment to expect success of communitarian ideas. The social component of public policies was associated with failing socialism and thus widely questioned. In a period when, under the pressures of globalization, the role of the welfare state and its reform became the order of the day in affluent, democratic countries, the former communist states could hardly rely on retaining a comprehensive commitment to welfare provision. The ‘transition’ thus incorporated the need for adjustment to the new conditions, which nevertheless took different forms in the different states. Scholars interested in studying particularly the changes in Central and Eastern European

countries started testing the application of the existing schools of thought in the post-communist context. Over time, a consensus has been forged around the combination of factors defining welfare state restructuring, such as the existing historical institutional setting, socioeconomic cleavages and the influence of international institutions (cf. Manning, 2004; Orenstein, 2008; Cerami & Vanhuysse, 2009), even if opinions differ regarding the importance of each or the interrelationship between them. Scholars have noted that

the transition-related economic downturn and fiscal pressures have affected the playing field in the post-socialist countries; however, economic arguments have played a secondary role, and the focus has been mainly on the specific legacies and actors’ choices. Despite severe changes that have shaken institutional structures and decision-making patterns following the collapse of communism, institutionalists have argued that countries’ responses have followed a certain path-dependent logic (Inglot, 2008). Actor-centered approaches have explored the role of party politics and interest groups under conditions of political pluralism and have mainly shown that they have not replicated Western patterns (Orenstein, 1998; Tavits & Letki, 2009). An increasing influence of the agenda of international agents – moving between the two extremes: the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) encouraged ‘social liberalism’ and ‘European welfare conservatism’ promoted by the ILO (International Labour Organization) – has been observed (Deacon et al., 1997). Furthermore, evidence has suggested that the reluctance for deeper positive integration in Europe have left the ‘European Social Model’ a rather fuzzy concept. The project of social Europe has been found sidelined by the neoliberal logic of the single market and the monetary union (Whyman et al., 2012). The 2008 crisis and European Union’s (EU) answer to it have been seen as particularly hurtful to the possibilities for European convergence (Galgoczi, 2013). Given the existing welfare diversity, attempts to place the post-communist welfare

regimes under Esping-Andersen’s typology have proved futile. The most dominant view seems to be the one which regard their welfare models as hybrids, given shared features with different types of the existing Western models as well as the variety among the post-communist states themselves (Baum-Ceisig et al., 2008; Cerami & Vanhuysse, 2009; Schubert et al., 2009). The post-communist countries, which share many common traits with the Bismarckian conservative tradition, complemented by some universal elements of the Beveridgean tradition (cf. Bonoli, 1997), have during the transition faced pressure to adopt a more liberal attitude toward their welfare policies. Consequently, features of both the conservative and liberal models could be discerned, whereas development of social-democratic forms of welfare policy would be most unlikely to emerge (Deacon et al., 1997). The countries of the former Yugoslavia have been predominantly excluded from these

comparative analyses. The emergence of national identity cleavages there put socioeconomic issues on the back burner. The discourse has been for decades dominated by the issues of nationalism and ethnic polarization, although there have been those that have noted that economic grievances have been intentionally converted ‘into nationalist rage, leading to a vicious war and sabotaging chances for liberal democracy for years to come’ (Ost, 2007, p. 89). This article picks up on this line of reasoning, and by examining the welfare outcomes that came to be two decades after the secession, aims to illuminate the complexities and interactions of economic and political processes in given time and space that accounted for their development. Drawing upon Marshall’s concept of tripartite citizenship (Marshall, 2008 [1949]), the article explores how the political and civic components have shaped the social dimension of citizenship, that is, citizens’ ability to balance market effects with the state involvement. It tests the explanatory potential of established schools of thought in the context of transition – where political and economic systems have taken various shapes, which have not necessarily followed other models, be it Western or Eastern European. It argues that the nature of the political transformation processes has changed income distribution patterns, and therefore social citizenship should be

analyzed beyond traditional interpretations known to established pluralist and capitalist societies. Thus, for understanding a welfare state activity in the post-Yugoslav context, a typical analysis of market rules, ideological interpretations and voter’s preferences may say less compared to an analysis of how political structures shaped actual practices of social citizenship either as participative or exclusivist, bottom-up or top-down, or deliberative or clientelist. Given the increasing importance of cross-border interconnectedness, internationally diffused ideas as well as European integration also influenced the changing nature of social citizenship. The article begins by introducing the concepts of social citizenship and welfare state

from historical and contemporary perspective. Subsequently, the former Yugoslav states are brought into the picture. The interplay of explanatory factors is illustrated in order to provide a better understanding of the specifics that led to adopting different approaches to social citizenship. Finally, country cases are clustered and explained accordingly.