ABSTRACT
Countries transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy have a wide range of problems to confront, any one ofwhich can derail the transition process. The opening up of the economy to market pressures is invariably accompanied by plunging living standards and intense political and social pressures. In many instances, these pressures are sufficient to tip the country back into authoritarian rule (Linz & Stepan, 1996). At least as important as economic prosperity is the establishment of widely supported democratic institutions. Without such institutions, and the rules and procedures that underpin them, democratic consolidation is unlikely to take root and a return to authoritarianism becomes ever more likely. Key among the institutions that require widespread public support in order to foster democratic consolidation is elections. The efficient operation of democracy assumes, as a minimum requirement, the
existence of free, competitive elections. However, as elections have proliferated
around the world in many diverse political and cultural settings, it has become apparent that while elections may often be “free” by a strict definition of the term, ruling parties and incumbent elites may still exercise such an influence on the outcome that they can hardly be considered “fair”. Manipulating the outcome of an election can be achieved in a variety of indirect ways, such as stifling debate or restricting media freedom, so that an election, while nominally competitive and open to no serious objection in the way in which the votes are counted, may all the same be heavily weighted in favour of the governing authorities (Birch, 2012; Schedler, 2006). In fact, undermining an election can occur at any point in the electoral cycle, from the pre-election period through to the campaign and its aftermath (Norris, 2012). A lack of electoral integrity can, of course, have broader implications for the pol-
itical system as a whole. Political institutions and how they operate reveal messages about the principles and norms of the political culture that shape people’s beliefs and values (Galbreath & Rose, 2008). A lack of integrity in electoral institutions undermines the basic principles of fairness and impartiality that lie at the heart of a well-ordered and functioning democratic society. Moreover, a political culture that sustains widespread corruption harms democratic citizenship, by weakening democratic knowledge and citizens’ sense of efficacy and trust in the institutions of government (Linde, 2012; Rothstein, 2009). And not least, institutional corruption further encourages low-level societal corruption in a vicious circle that continually undermines public support for democratic values. This paper tests the hypothesis that the public’s perception of electoral fairness in
countries transitioning from communism to democracy influences their views of the democratic process. Our cases studies are Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, all countries where, more than a decade ago, it appeared that the achievement of full democratization was just a matter of time. In the last decade, however, all three countries (and particularly the first two) have returned to authoritarian rule while still retaining a nominal commitment to free and competitive elections. The first section reviews the research on free elections and their links to democratic consolidation. The second section provides an overview of elections in the three countries, while the third section examines the means by which elections in the three countries have been manipulated as well as the broader context of corruption among public official. The fourth section tests four explanations for beliefs about electoral integrity and evaluates the impact of electoral integrity on satisfaction with democracy.
