ABSTRACT

Despite the enthusiasm surrounding the Colour Revolutions and the Arab Spring, the world’s share of democracies has stagnated over the past 15 years. The steady rise of China, Russia, and Iran has also led to warnings of a resurgence of “authoritarian great powers”, especially in light of the financial crisis centred in the USA and Western Europe (Gat, 2007; Plattner, 2011). On the positive side, however, democracy remains remarkably popular as an ideal. In the Global barometer’s most recent survey, two out of three respondents say democracy is their most favoured political system, including a majority in 49 of the 55 countries. Yet there is evidence, much expanded upon in this issue, that commitments to liberal democracy in practice are not as strong (Carlson & Turner, 2009; Krastev, 2007; Shin & Wells, 2005). Nominally pro-democratic citizens frequently favour limitations on electoral accountability and individual rights in the service of improved governance or economic growth. Further, there are rising concerns that many citizens, especially across the developing world, are turning away from democracy out of frustration with democratic performance (Chang et al., 2007; Kurlantzick, 2013). Aparticular challenge todemocracy hasbeen the spread and resilience of dictatorships

that adopt traditionally democratic institutions, such as legislatures, independent courts, and elections (Diamond, 2002; Gandhi, 2008; Levitsky&Way, 2010;Magaloni, 2006). China, Russia, and Iran, for instance, all feature legislatures (albeit of varying strength) and contested elections (although for China only at the local level). The image of these countries as transitional countries steadily moving towards democracy has long faded

(Carothers, 2002), producing a large literature on the sources of stability within these transitional regimes (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Magaloni, 2006). For the most part, scholars have focused on the use of quasi-democratic institutions to maintain elite coalitions (Brownlee, 2007; Gandhi, 2008; Magaloni, 2006) and to generate popular support through clientelistic linkages (Blaydes, 2011; Lust-Okar, 2006). In contrast tomany transitional regimes, themore established democracies appear to

be losing support among their highly educated citizens. InDemocratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited, Norris (2011) observes the existence of a “democratic deficit” that arises from a combination of growing public expectations, negative news, and failing government performance. Citizens may have unwavering support for democratic principles, but they may at the same time be highly critical of how democracy works in practice. The “critical citizen” is certainly becomingmore vocal in new and established liberal democracies. However, in transitional regimes, citizens may have democratic values but at the same time support an authoritarian political regime that provides political authority, social stability, and security. This is in part, because as Norris finds in her study, many citizens with democratic values in authoritarian countries need to consider the dangers and uncertainties that may flow from transitioning to a full liberal democracy. While we know a great deal about citizen values and democratic orientations in the

Western democracies, a question that is often overlooked is how citizens view democracy in transitional regimes, particularly in Eastern Europe and across East Asia. In many of these countries citizens favour democracy in the abstract but are less confident about whether democracy will deliver good governance in practice. In terms of how citizens view their regime, past work has investigated the clientelistic relationships that can become central to citizens’ political outlooks (Blaydes, 2011; Lust-Okar, 2006; Magaloni, 2006), rising disengagement from electoral politics (Ekman, 2009), and the links between cultural/religious histories and toleration for authoritarianism (Bauer & Bell, 1999). What is missing, however, is a clear understanding of how normative values and

political attitudes about democracy operate within these regimes. This special issue looks closely at how democracy is understood and experienced in transitioning regimes. A central goal of the issue is to look at the underlying cultural and political orientations and indicate how such orientations stem from and reinforce political systems. The articles focus is on unconsolidated democracies in Eastern Europe and East Asia with comparisons also made to the regions’ liberal democracies. Below we provide an overview of some of the key elements of citizen orientations towards democracy. We then describe the value of looking specifically at Eastern Europe and East Asia, summarize the key findings of the individual papers, and finally indicate some avenues for future research.