ABSTRACT
Conceptions of bounded rationality can and should be used by philosophical naturalists. To show how this can be done, this chapter first outlines three systems of reasoning that are constitutive of the so-called “standard picture” of rationality. It then goes on to highlight two major criticisms of that picture, which are associated with bounded rationality—involving, however, fundamentally different meanings of this concept. The chapter then introduces some major assumptions of philosophical naturalism and the challenges that they typically face. Finally, the prospects and limits of bounded rationality for naturalism in epistemology are discussed, with occasional considerations concerning the philosophy of science. It will become clear that naturalism must be sophisticated in order to meet several challenges in the attempt to naturalize rationality, or to use empirical research from psychology for the purposes of naturalizing epistemology. Naturalism based on Simon’s and Gigerenzer’s version of bounded rationality is normative and based on ecological considerations. It is also clearly limited in its scope and possible uses, and it should therefore be reflexive and self-critical regarding its own limits.
