In the research and discussion of corporate governance in both developed and developing/emerging markets (DEMs), there is no doubt that the agency theory (the Anglo-American model) dominates other theories such as the stakeholders, stewardship and institutional theories (see Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Reed, 2002; Daily et al., 2003). For developed markets, the interest in corporate governance, particularly the agency theory, can be attributed to two related factors. First is the seminal work of Berle and Means (1932) that exposed the inherent challenges or issues in a firm due to the separation of ownership from control which has resulted in the inherent principal (shareholders)–agent (manager) problems. Related to the first, the second factor sustaining interest in corporate governance is corporate scandals such as Enron, Barings Bank and the recent financial crisis that started in 2007-09 (see Kirkpatrick, 2009; Malin, 2010).