Since the end of the Cold War, the international system has experienced signiﬁcant transformations in both the dynamics that determine power relations within it, and the normative principles that govern those dynamics. States held to marginal status in the bipolar confrontation, and by postcolonial vestiges of previous eras, have risen to become important actors on the global stage, often on the basis of economic power and regional preponderance.1 While deﬁnitions for the category of “rising” or “emerging” power have abounded in the academic literature and consensus on criteria has remained elusive (see further below),2 scholarly emphasis has settled on countries such as Brazil, India, Turkey, South Africa-and more controversially permanent Security Council members Russia and China-as the bearers of relevant dynamism in the international system. For global governance, the result has paradoxically been both the
dogged persistence of institutional forms and fundamental change in the way in which states, both established and rising, interact with them. While key decision making bodies such as the Security Council have remained solidly resistant to changes in their composition, eﬀective and legitimate global governance-even, and particularly, in the traditional established-power chasses gardées of collective security and conﬂict resolution-is today unthinkable without the involvement of these rising powers.