Over the last decade, active engagement of rising powers in international intervention has arisen as a prominent issue both in international security practice and in academic debates.1 Even though rising powers have a longstanding tradition of participation in peace operations as troop contributors, a greater willingness not only to take up more important roles and responsibilities, but also to exercise greater influence in decision making processes became a common core feature of the international strategies of countries like Brazil, India, and South Africa in the first decade of the twenty-first century. This willingness also raised expectations as to the impacts of such

enhanced engagement on peace operations themselves, as new challenges arose in conflict and postconflict contexts. To meet these expectations, and to avoid repeating the failures observed in Bosnia and Rwanda in the 1990s, peace operations went through dramatic changes in their nature, scope, and objectives. Much broader mandates ultimately made them more robust and granted them a multidimensional profile in which non-military components were enhanced as issues related to reconciliation and the reconstruction of the institutional, social, and economic fabric of areas plagued by civil war became core objectives.2 In overall terms, the changing nature of peace operationsunderlined by the shift from the state to the individuals as the major referent object of international security-presented new possibilities and greater room for rising powers to act.