ABSTRACT
This chapter examines why the billions of Renminbi invested in the rapid, largely state-driven economic development in Xinjiang have not had the social consequences assumed by the proponents of this developmentalism with Chinese characteristics. Between 2000 and 2008, the most basic measure of growth, gross domestic product (GDP), increased in Xinjiang by an average of over 15 per cent. Just as the China model of development is not necessarily bringing happiness to all Chinese, the even more extreme form of the developmental state transforming Xinjiang is failing to adequately win over the Uyghurs. While the Western accounts of Xinjiang generally focus on religion, repression and identity politics as causes, the chapter has sought to demonstrate that underlying these issues is the overriding importance of the Chinese Communist Partys (CCPs) developmental state model and developmentalist mindset that assumed that rapid economic growth would solve most of the area's problems.
