Introduction

Relations between Taiwan and China have seen remarkable changes since 2008, when the Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), regained power after eight years of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) minority rule under the former independence activist and president, Chen Shui-Bian. The new KMT administration led by Ma Ying-Jiu immediately embarked on a new proactive China policy, which had been carefully prepared during informal talks with the Chinese leadership since the mid-2000s, by establishing an informal Economic Trade and Cultural Forum of the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to discuss practical matters of mutual concern and future cross-Strait policies. ¹ New cross-Strait negotiations were set on track that have produced, to date, 20 bilateral agreements (xieyi) with far-reaching significance for the evolution of the cross-Strait relationship. ² Most importantly, direct transportation, communication and trade links were established in late 2008, and in June 2010, the two sides signed an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) to spur cross-Straittrade liberalization and economic integration (Chow 2013). Although Taiwan’s new China approach was sternly opposed by the DPP at first, the results of the presidential and legislative elections in January 2012 showed that the incumbent Ma administration had a fairly solid public mandate. After the defeat of the presidential hopeful, Tsai Ying-Wen, in that year, the DPP was forced to undertake some serious soul-searching concerning the question of whether, and to what extent, it would have to adjust its own China policy in order to stand a fair chance of winning important national elections again in the future (Schubert 2012a).