ABSTRACT
For most of its existence, the European integration project has been imagined as a territorially, culturally, legally and institutionally relatively bounded process of institution-building between the participating European states (Smith 1996: 5). In the last decades, these boundaries have increasingly been reconsidered, both from within and from without. Internally, member states have opted for various forms of selective participation. Externally, numerous countries have become affiliated with sections of the acquis communautaire. While the European Union (EU)’s regulatory outreach is increasingly acknowledged (Bradford 2012; Damro 2012; Lavenex 2004; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009), the question of how far this also entails some kind of institutional opening towards the respective third countries has hardly been addressed. Indeed, the
classic ‘Community Method’ of EU policy-making suggests little flexibility for such openings. Participation in the EU’s central decision-making bodies (the Council, Parliament and Commission) still constitutes ‘a synonym for full membership’ (Filtenborg et al. 2002: 400). But is this external radiation of EU rules really decoupled from organizational integration with third countries? Acknowledging the internal diversification of governance modes in the EU,
this contribution argues that the advent of ‘policy-making without legislating’ (He´ritier 2002) through transgovernmental committees and regulatory agencies offers hitherto understudied opportunities for the flexible integration of nonmember states (Lavenex 2008, 2014). Focusing on the more formalized and politically independent EU regulatory agencies, the contribution pursues two aims: it provides a first mapping of third country participation in seven EU agencies and, in a second step analyses the plausibility of two distinct logics of external differentiated integration: a foreign policy and a functionalist approach. The distinction between these logics starts from the observation that EU regu-
latory extension is the product of both direct foreign policy initiatives (such as the European Neighbourhood Policy [ENP]) and of indirect, sector-specific policy diffusion. The foreign policy logic is political and serves the interest of the EU as a whole. A third country’s inclusion in a specific regulatory body is not a goal in itself but is an instrument in a foreign policy that is based on the extension of the EU’s acquis communautaire. Organizational inclusion thus aims to prepare for EU accession, familiarize with the acquis communautaire or, from a more symbolic perspective, express a privileged relation with the Union. Flexible integration in transgovernmental structures hence reflects third countries’ overarching association status vis-a`-vis the EU. The second logic of organizational inclusion does not flow ‘top-down’ from
overarching foreign policy decisions. It takes its origins in ‘bottom-up’ processes of policy diffusion owing to functional interdependence in particular policy sectors. Rather than the EU’s central foreign policy institutions, it is the transgovernmental bodies themselves which guide the co-operation with third country regulators. Flexible integration should thus reflect patterns of sectoral interdependence and bureaucratic affinity rather than overarching association relations. Apart from underlining different drivers of external differentiation, the
foreign policy and functionalist logics also imply contrasting understandings of the EU’s internal constitution and external ramifications. The foreign policy logic proposes a model of concentric circles, with a cohesive EU at the core surrounded by different layers of third countries enjoying participation opportunities by way of their territorially defined association status. The functionalist logic, in contrast, presupposes a polyarchic EU, a ‘conglomerate of sectoral regimes which . . . are only loosely coupled to the polity’s centralized foreign policy’ (Lavenex 2014: 887) and which reach out towards third country regulators in differentiated ways. While the notion of concentric circles implies centripetal effects, reinforcing the integrity of the core, the
notion of polyarchic sectoral regimes emphasizes internal fragmentation and centrifugal dynamics. The next section introduces the layer of transgovernmental co-operation in
the EU as opportunity structure for the flexible integration of non-member states. Linking up with the literature on EU regulatory extension, the foreign policy and functionalist logic of external differentiated integration are then proposed. The remainder of the contribution maps third country participation in seven EU regulatory agencies and explores the respective importance of both differentiation dynamics.
