ABSTRACT
Now, although I have developed an argument to Heck’s conclusion on the basis of a sketch that he presents, it is not clear to me that he would accept the development. For with respect to at least some cases, he seems willing to allow that subjects in similar positions to Flo and Eliza with respect to some individual might both be able to think thoughts that both would express by the use of “That person is a philosopher”, but unable thereby to think the same thought (Heck 2002, 21-25). If there were reason to deny that thinkers so placed are ever in a position so to think the same context-bound thought, then that would serve to block the argument. Indeed, the argument would be blocked if there were reason to claim that, although pairs of thinkers can be in such a position, they can be so only if they both are also in a position to express the thought by the use of “You are a philosopher.” However, it seems to me plausible that the conditions specified in the case are co-tenable and allowing this is anyway concessive with respect to Heck’s claims about “You”- thoughts. (For discussion and defence of related claims about “That”, see Dickie and Rattan (2010).) And, so, it seems to me plausible that the argument supports a version of Heck’s claim, to the effect that there are thoughts that can be expressed by the use of “You” that are not context-bound in the way that the appropriate use of “You” is context-bound. Furthermore, it is not clear to me how an analogous argument could be run for thought – as opposed, perhaps, to some notion of what is said – without taking an analogous view about the possibility that Eliza and Flo might think the same thought. So, if I were precluded from taking that view, I would find myself in the unfortunate position that Heck characterised of not knowing how to argue for his claim about “You”.
