ABSTRACT
The basic observation from which the two-concept view develops is that we seem to be able to make actions rationally intelligible even if the agent is mistaken about her normative reasons. The way the point tends to be put is that ‘the agent’s reason’ for (say) drinking the content of the bottle (in Williams’s example) was that he believed the bottle contained gin.2 Identifying ‘the agent’s reason’ enables us to make his drinking petrol and tonic rationally intelligible (though of course not under that description). Evidently, the reason we invoke here is not a normative reason. There is nothing that counts in favour of the agent’s drinking the content of that bottle, yet he does so intelligibly. Again consider actions that reflect poor judgement or pursue bad objectives. Even though the agent has no normative reason for doing what she does, at least no undefeated normative reason, her action may be rationally intelligible.
