ABSTRACT
David Martin Jones argues that we can profitably turn to the ideas of the sixteenth-century Dutch humanist Justus Lipsius to counter the pernicious influence of abstract, axiomatic, normative models of international order in contemporary geopolitics. Lipsius, Jones argues, draws on Roman history and Machiavelli to show that in a complex and uncertain world it is a realistic prudence and not recourse to abstract ideals – for example, justice – that best serves raison d'état: the reason, but also right, of the State. Jones’ purpose in turning to Lipsius is to show its relevance to contemporary international relations in a post-Cold War period characterized by disastrous policy choices, unclear diplomatic responses, and failed military strategies, from Afghanistan to the recent events in Ukraine. The essay, then, is intellectual history in the service of political counsel: a very Lipsian approach. The counsel provided is a genuine provocation to political theorists and students of international relations as it suggests a morally inflected realism opposed both to moral idealism and amoral, Hobbesian realism. I am not an intellectual historian so I cannot comment on the expository work of Jones’ essay. Instead, in this brief commentary I would like to focus first on some potential difficulties in ‘using’ Lipsius today and then address the broader problem of the differences between, and attractions of, abstract moral and legal principles, on the one hand, and a more ‘phronetic’ account of prudence, on the other.
