INTRODUCTION

Public opinion on defense spending has changed widely through the years and it has been shown to have a statistically significant impact on policy outcomes.1 Researchers spent a significant amount of time studying the determinants of public opinion on defense spending at the end of the Cold War. While many of these determinants have not changed, the Soviet Union is no longer a major factor in US defense spending preferences – as it was during the Cold War. Additionally, in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, the world has entered into a new security environment. Hence, public opinion on defense spending has likely changed since the end of the Cold War and deserves to be revisited. We use a variation of several modeling frameworks built throughout numerous years of

academic research on defense spending preferences and we incorporate recent data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) cumulative data file (CDF) along with the ANES 2008 panel data that was released in 2009. Some academics such as Bartels (1994) concluded that politics had become less of a determining factor on defense spending preferences since the end of the cold war and that ‘willingness to use force’ and

Defence and Peace Economics, 2015 Vol. 26, No. 1, 75-88, https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2013.848578

SENCER ECERa* AND NICHOLAS J. VEASEYb

1. INTRODUCTION

Public opinion on defense spending has changed wide y through the year nd it has been hown to have a statistically sig ificant impact on p licy outcomes.1 Researchers spent a significant amount f time studying the determinants of public opinion on def nse spending at the end f the Cold War. While many of th se determinants hav not changed, the Soviet Union is no longer a major factor in US defense sp nding preferences – as it was during the Cold War. Additio ally, in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, the world has entered into a new security environment. Hence, public opinion on defense spending has likely changed since the end f the Cold War and deserves to e revisited. W use a v iati of sev ral modeling frameworks built throughout numerous years of

academic research on d fense spending preferences and we incorporat recent data from the American National Election S udie (ANES) cumulative dat file (CDF) along with the ANES 2008 panel data that was r leased in 2009. Som academics such as Bartels (1994) conclud d that politics had become less of a determ ing factor on d fense spending preferences since the end of the cold war and that ‘willingness to use force’ and

Defence and Peace Economics, 2015 Vol. 26, No. 1, 75-88, https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2013.848578