ABSTRACT
It would seem to be self-evident that it cannot be ethically defensible to remember life during apartheid nostalgically, as does Dlamini in Native Nostalgia (2009). Yet how can ethics – concepts of right and wrong behaviour – apply to memory which is, for most of us, much of the time, beyond our control? Margalit asks if there can be obligations to remember, or, the converse, to forget (2002, ix). He points out that we can only say that something ought to be done if it can be done (55). Clearly,we cannot entirely bringmemory traces under conscious control. But are there ever circumstances in which we are able to do so? In Memory, History, andForgetting, Ricoeur discusses the dual characteristics ofmemory: it is not only
It ould see to be self-evident that it cannot be ethica ly defensible to re e ber life during apartheid nostalgica ly, as does la ini in ative ostalgia (2009). et ho can ethics – concepts of right and rong behaviour – apply to e ory hich is, for ost of us, uch of the ti e, beyond our control? argalit asks if
there can be obligations to re e ber, or, the converse, to forget (2002, ix). e points out that e can only say that so ething ought to be done if it can be done (55). learly, e cannot entirely bring e ory traces under conscious control. ut are there ever circu stances in hich e are able to do so? In e ory, istory, andForge ting, icoeur discusses the dual characteristics of e ory: it is not only
HISTORICAL JUSTICE
the ‘welcoming’ of stored impressions, but also the active search for images of the past (2004, 56). It is in the now of intentional remembering that ethics is pertinent: ‘use implies the possibility of abuse’ (2004, 57).
