ABSTRACT
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we analyse how MEPs and interest groups position themselves in policy debates and the extent to which this results in alignments. Second, we characterize MEP-group alignments by describing which parties and group types adopted similar (and dissimilar) positions. Finally, we analyse the conditions under which different types of groups are closely aligned to or strongly distanced from different parties. When categorizing the MEP-group dyads according to three substantive
positions, we get nine different combinations (see Table 1). At first sight, parties and groups do not align well; the relation between the positions taken by both actors is weak and insignificant (Chi2 ¼ 5.403, df ¼ 4, p ¼ 0.2484) and we observe groups and parties taking similar positions in only 33 per cent of the dyads (the diagonal of Table 1; n ¼ 435). Second, there is
a considerable difference in position taking by MEPs and interest groups. Most MEPs (n ¼ 738 or 56 per cent) take a moderate position, i.e., they support the legislative proposal or ask for some minor amendments. In contrast, interest groups are more likely to adopt outspoken positions: in 44 per cent of the observations they seek to block the proposal or ask for changes which would drastically transform the proposal. In only 24 per cent do interest groups support the EC proposal without asking for modifications. However, the diagonal – indicating the propensity to adopt similar positions – is misleading in order to analyse alignment and de-alignment between MEPs and interest groups. Equally interesting are the situations where MEPs support the EC proposal unconditionally, but where interest groups seek to block or change the proposal profoundly (cell 3 1; n ¼ 117), or vice versa (cell 1 3; n ¼ 80). In the next paragraphs, we examine whether centre-right politicians (ALDE,
EPP, ECR) and business interests mostly endorse legislation submitted by a centre-right EC, while more leftists MEPs (Greens, S&D, UEN/GNL) and NGOs are more likely to oppose legislation proposed by the EC. Generally, such political competition should be more visible when groups and MEPs adopt positions that are strongly in favour or against proposed legislation. Therefore, we should observe significant differences in group-party alignment between the four constellations where (a) both MEPs and groups strongly support the EC (cell 3 3; n ¼ 53), (b) both MEPs and groups strongly oppose the EC (cell 1 1; n ¼ 140), (c) MEPs support, but groups oppose
legislative proposal. This position was coded as being 1 ¼ ‘seeking major changes or blocking the proposal’, 2 ¼ ‘supporting the proposal, but asking for changes’, and 3 ¼ ‘supporting the proposal without changing it’. For some proposals we had multiple statements from the same groups or from different MEPs belonging to the same party group. In cases with conflicting statements, we double-checked our coding and subsequently used the modal position in order to determine one position per actor-proposal combination. Sometimes minor incongruences could be detected in MEP positions; these were mostly related to different, rather detailed aspects of the proposal that were discussed in the statements. In the rare instance that no unambiguous position could be coded, the MEP position was labelled as ‘unclear’ and omitted from further analysis. We did not observe any individual MEP who changed positions on a proposal. Note that, for the purpose of this contribution, we ignore the precise substantive nature of the position, i.e., we do not qualify positions as being ‘leftist’ or ‘rightist’. We only consider the alignment of the adopted positions, not the precise content of the positions themselves. How the positions of different organized interests align with various party groups implies that we have an ‘indirect measure’ of left-right. Indeed, on some occasions some groups may have adopted positions which do not correspond with their traditional ideological line. Yet, as we show below, we can produce a robust account of alignments and de-alignments, even if we ignore the precise substance of policy positions and rely on the traditional left-right profile of parties. Furthermore, we coded the organized interests into several categories. A first
category consists of NGOs representing a diffuse constituency such as environmental groups, consumer groups, religious groups, labour unions or other civil society organizations. The next category is business interests and includes business associations, professional organizations and individual firms. Finally, we have smaller categories for research institutes and associations representing subnational authorities.
