ABSTRACT
Language is as much a means of thinking as it is communicating about the world, and indexical expressions are equally the vehicles of both, especially when purely qualitative discriminations are cumbersome or unavailable. If first person expressions is correct, then primitive self-consciousness is anonymous, to use Manfred Frank's description, and its content, ipseity, or the pour-soi feature of conscious states is not to be described in first-person terms. Subjectivity is equivalent to the property of perspectivity or being perspectival, and the latter is the pour-soi aspect of consciousness. One might argue that a perspectival array is first-personal because its salience can only occasion a first-person identification. Once it distinguish subjectivity and first person, the door is open to identifying the content of primitive self-consciousness with a perspectival array. An integration of data vectors from a point of view is always present in our indexical experience even when this integration itself lacks salience.
