ABSTRACT
This chapter examines how a particular theory of discrimination, the objective-egalitarian account developed by Deborah Hellman, can be applied to cases of private differential treatment, such as dating preferences, in order to help stipulate a norm of non-discrimination for an egalitarian ethos. It then indicates how aspects of the theory need to be revised to provide a compelling framework for understanding the ethical status of private discrimination. The chapter focuses on what basis the objective-egalitarian account would distinguish wrongful differential treatment (i.e. wrongful discrimination) from acceptable differential treatment. The concept 'private discrimination', when it is mentioned at all, is used variously in the literature. By insisting, however, that individuals in their private capacities and in terms of their dating preferences could have the power to demean each other, my account opens itself up to an objection that would not be applied to the original objective-egalitarian account.
