ABSTRACT

What was once said about the theory of illocution, a central part of speech act theory, holds for speech act theory in its entirety: namely, that its influence on contemporary philosophy can hardly be exaggerated. 1 Speech act theory is certainly one of the outstanding philosophical innovations of the twentieth century. J. L. Austin, who is generally celebrated as its founder, was already aware of the innovative character of his discovery. At the very outset of his How to Do Things with Words, a work published posthumously in 1962 and with which this theory made its first public appearance, one reads: “The phenomenon to be discussed is very widespread and obvious, and it cannot fail to have been already noticed, at least here and there, by others. Yet I have not found attention paid to it specifically.” 2 This assessment of the situation has since become well established; influential authors, such as Wolfgang Stegmüller 3 and John Searle, 4 have repeated it.