Early Phenomenology and the Origins of Analytic Philosophy *

In 1956 Gilbert Ryle described the revolt against psychologism as a defining moment of analytic philosophy. ¹ Ryle constitutes no exception. From Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore to Peter Strawson and Michael Dummett, many analytic philosophers saw in antipsychologism a distinguishing feature of their own tradition. That may seem surprising since antipsychologism extended far beyond the bounds of analytic philosophy. Especially among the members of the phenomenological school founded by Husserl, the clear demarcation of the object of their research from that of psychology belonged to the highest of principles. For phenomenologists there was no greater sin than to fall victim to the temptation of psychologism. One wonders how it could have ever occurred to Ryle to view antipsychologism as a defining moment of analytic philosophy since he wanted to distinguish the latter clearly from phenomenology, which he himself knew well.