In 1952, Israel embarked on a nuclear weapons production program, and by 1967 Israel had succeeded in assembling two nuclear weapons for possible delivery against its adversaries in the Six-Day War (Cohen 1998, Hersh 1991). In just fifteen years, Israel had gone from a state with no meaningful nuclear infrastructure to become the world’s sixth nuclear-armed state. During this time period, the great powers showed remarkable diversity in their responses to Israel’s nuclear development. After discovering the existence of Israel’s covert program in 1958, the United States applied a variety of diplomatic, intelligence, and military tools designed to dissuade Israel from its nuclear course. The Soviet Union was very concerned about the prospect of Israeli proliferation, and drew up contingency plans for a possible military attack against Israel’s nuclear facilities (Ginor and Remez 2007). Great Britain publicly opposed nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, but did not take an active role in countering Israeli proliferation. The Chinese appeared indifferent to Israel’s imminent nuclearization, refraining from even taking a public stance on the issue. Meanwhile, France actively aided Israel’s nuclear development, providing Israel with sensitive nuclear assistance that was essential to the rapid development of Israel’s nuclear program (Kroenig 2010, 67–110).