At the beginning of the 21st century, mainstream epistemology is involved in a post-Gettier analysis of knowledge aimed at amending and improving the formula of ‘justied true belief’. Its objective is to state the conditions under which a subject S knows that p, with p being a proposition (cf. Ichikawa and Steup 2014). From a meta-epistemological perspective and in view of the historical background to the problem, this is a rather limited approach to exploring phenomena of cognition. One reason for the narrowing of the debate lies in the split of philosophy of science from epistemology in early twentieth-century philosophy (cf. Ammon 2011). While questions related to the progress of science and the dynamics of knowledge became a major thematic concern within philosophy of science, the conceptual analysis of knowledge became one of the core topics of epistemology. This difference in emphasis is re†ected in the different perspectives adopted by their research questions: whereas in philosophy of science the emphasis lies predominantly on providing an epistemic description of a system, in epistemology it is the epistemic state of a person that is of primary concern.1