ABSTRACT
Epistemic internalists and externalists disagree deeply about the fundamental nature of epistemic properties like epistemic justification. This chapter surveys general issues in the epistemic internalism/externalism debate: what is the distinction, what motivates it, and what arguments can be given on both sides. It examines the internalism/externalism debate as regards to the specific case of the epistemology of memory belief. While one can endorse versions of internalism or externalism for a variety of epistemic statuses, such as epistemic rationality, warrant, and entitlement, the chapter focuses specifically on epistemic justification. Actual and possible cases of blindsight, serendipitous brain-tumors, chicken-sexers and clairvoyance share this basic structure: unbeknownst to the subjects, they have highly reliable belief-forming processes that produce and sustain true beliefs regarding some subject matter. Epistemic internalists who insist on a reflective accessibility requirement on justification might begin by appealing to what has been called episodic or experiential memory.
