ABSTRACT
Ludwig Wittgenstein's discussions of memory belong to his middle and later periods, where philosophy of mind and epistemology became a more direct concern. The later philosophy in particular is therapeutic in conception, holding that philosophical problems should be dissolved rather than solved. Wittgensteinian therapy aims to show how philosophical disputes rest on what he termed 'grammatical illusion'. Scientism regards philosophy as part of science, thus conflating the conceptual and the empirical. In particular, Wittgenstein criticises how psychologists have investigated memory. This chapter refers to arguments that Wittgenstein presents against certain conceptions of memory – yet some writers deny that he offers 'arguments' in any traditional sense. One could describe them as 'considerations' instead of 'arguments'; but the Wittgenstein literature has surprisingly little to say on what is meant by 'argument' and 'refutation'. Read, for instance, contrasts therapy with 'argument as traditionally conceived', leaving the tradition unspecified.
