ABSTRACT
Although the debate over moral vegetarianism has been going on for millennia (Shapiro, 2000), there has been a resurgence of interest in this issue in the last part of the twentieth century. One of the foundational philosophical works on this subject is The Case for Animal Rights (1983). This paper will not critique Regan’s theory on animal rights. Rather, for the moment, suppose he is right; animals are subjects-of-a-life with interests of their own that matter as much to them as similar interests matter to humans. Therefore, animals have the right to live their lives without interference from humans. His conclusion follows, therefore, that animal agriculture interferes in the lives of millions of animals annually, so humans are morally obligated to consume a vegan or vegetarian diet. The purpose of this paper is to examine the moral vegan conclusion of Regan’s animal rights theory, rather than the rights theory itself. It is also the objective of this paper to examine alternative conclusions. In other words, might there be alternatives to the moral vegetarian conclusion drawn from animal rights theory?
