ABSTRACT
“Moral psychology” designates inquiry into the psychological infrastructure required for moral thought and practice. This chapter begins with the “orthodox” simplified model of action that has prevailed in much contemporary philosophy, economics, and decision theory. Motivation has long held a central place in debates in moral philosophy, because moral considerations are supposed to guide action, and action cannot take place without motivation—on this Aristotle, Hume, and Kant all agree. To illustrate how agency and the structure of motivation are bound together in a person’s identity, Frankfurt introduced a third intuitive “ideal type”, the “wanton addict”. The evaluative theory of desire implies that an addict’s values—reflecting his complexity as a person, his commitments, and his capacity for empathy—will continue to shape his dispositions to act in countless ways, even when addictive desires are predominant. Several features of the simplified model are especially noteworthy from the standpoint of moral psychology.
