ABSTRACT
As early as 2008, the International Crisis Group58 had reported a surge of civilian complaints against human rights abuses by the PNTL and the F-FDTL. As is common for ombuds-institutions, the Provedor is limited to investigative and deliberative powers only, and hence, the oversight effectiveness of the institution relies heavily on the compliance of other institutional actors: a practice not established in the Timorese context. Thus, while the Provedor could investigate these cases, summon the accused officers and forward recommendations to the respective involved authorities, the Provedor had no power of sanction and could not ensure whether the accused officers received punishment or not. In cases involving the PNTL, only a minor number of officers were punished according to the recommendations of the Provedor.59 In sum, although officially presented as a successful institution, the Provedor was limited in its effectiveness and remained a largely ‘ceremonial structure’, acting as a shell to cover the absence of meaningful oversight bodies within the respective security organizations. In fact, the role of the Provedor as the main institution handling misconduct by the police and the military is evidence of the general incapacity of democratic security governance in Timor-Leste.
