ABSTRACT
SESs are not dominated by CPR type arrangements. This is by no means meant as a criticism as Ostrom was simply using a set of case studies to demonstrate conditions under which actors may be able to sustain governance of a particular resource. But it does suggest that extending Ostrom’s earlier work beyond CPRs to other types of SESs is an exceedingly complicated challenge given the diversity of social and biophysical dynamics found across global SESs. This can lead to some confusion as in some of Ostrom’s later work she herself seemingly misses the opportunity to clarify what conditions tend to result in long-enduring common-pool resource systems as opposed to social-ecological systems more generally. Specifically, the section ‘Design Principles and Robust Social-Ecological Systems’ in Understanding Institutional Diversity (Ostrom, 2005) begins by reiterating the design principles for robust common-property institutions (Ostrom, 1990). So we can consider still unfinished the challenge of identifying the conditions that tend to lead to long-enduring social-ecological systems, much less the corresponding challenge of identifying the conditions that result in equitable distribution of resources across actors within SESs. But some guidance is given later in the chapter when Ostrom translates the design principles to a set of scoping questions including ‘Are there functional and creative efforts by local appropriators to craft effective stewardship mechanisms for local resources that should be recognized?’ (p. 271) and ‘How do we create a multiple-layer, polycentric system that can be dynamic, adaptive, and effective over time?’. Here direct inspiration is taken from Vincent Ostrom’s early work on polycentric governance (Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren, 1961) and also recognition of the role of learning and adaptation for sustaining SESs.
