ABSTRACT
Elinor Ostrom’s ‘Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms’ represents a concise yet sophisticated summary of the multi-method approach which informed so much of her work. I have always been struck by the diverse reactions that scholars have had to this work, as well as the multitude of subsequent research directions that have been influenced by the article. In regards to my own research agenda, Ostrom has been very influential in my approach to understanding the emergence of federal-tribal co-management of natural resources. In this article, I give a brief summary of the issue of co-management, and emphasize how the design principles, player types, and contextual factors identified in Ostrom’s article inform my approach to understanding the diversity of federal-tribal co-management arrangements that have been initiated thus far. I also suggest how Ostrom’s approach might be specifically adapted to the context of co-management, particularly through a differentiation between the norms held by elites as opposed to broader society, and how these evolve in such a way as to generate support or opposition to the inclusion of Native American stakeholders in the management of natural resources.
The concept of co-management
