ABSTRACT

Summary

In this chapter we will be dealing with a number of ethical theories, each one of which sheds light on one specific aspect of human conduct. We will be discussing in succession deontology, consequentialism and virtue ethics. Deontology emphasises in particular the constitutive side of operational practice, consequentialism emphasises the contextual side and virtue ethics the regulative side. As a result of modern technology the radius of action of people expands, and thus human accountability is extended. In our opinion engineers and managers are not powerless when facing scientific-technological development. The technological-organisational form-giving of social practices can also support actors in making sound choices. Moreover, the differentiation of social practices facilitates a better staggering of responsibilities.

Do technology and ethics really go together? Is it useful to develop a separate ethics of technology? Does ethics have any significance for engineers who simply want to solve concrete problems or for managers who have to run a factory? Is ethics not rather something for politicians and policy makers? We start with two statements which illustrate the way people in our culture think about the relation between technology and ethics.

As an information scientist I do not bother with ethics. It is not my field of study. I have to see that I deliver a good computer system that functions properly. What happens further with the product is the user’s responsibility.

I’m not in favour of genetic engineering in agriculture myself, but if we do not do it, it will be done by someone else. Besides, we cannot afford to lag behind.

289It is striking that in these statements technology is treated as an autonomous phenomenon which can be seen separate from human accountability, or which has its own scientific-technological logic which one cannot influence. And if ethical reflection were possible, it would be a reflection that comes not from technology itself, but one from outside that lays down limits to technology. In the statement cited first this emerges in the supposition that technology has no normativity in itself. It is not designing technology that demands ethical reflection but its application in a concrete context. Therefore technology here is no more than an instrument that can be utilised in a good or a bad manner. The second statement, on the contrary, stresses the autonomy of technological development. You may very well ask moral questions about science or the use of technology but it has little use as science and technology nevertheless run their own course and as human beings we have very little influence on that.

Both arguments are plausible. It is indeed true that a distinction should be made between the design phase and the utilisation phase (see Chapter 7): the designer cannot be held responsible for everything the consumer does with the product. In this respect it is justified when, for instance, a producer of weapons states that they are not responsible for the wars waged with the weapons they have developed. Yet this is not all there is to it. For even in the design of weapons numerous moral decisions are taken: requirements for the safety of the weapon or for the range and nature of the damage it can cause. May one, for instance, develop cluster bombs when many clever weapon systems can be developed that restrict the number of civil victims? The designer is not always responsible for what is done with the weapons they design, but they may be held responsible for the choices they make while in the process of designing. They can choose whether to make use of certain possibilities for development or not.

It cannot be denied either that numerous technologies are developed, like information and communication technology, genetic engineering and nanotechnology, each one of which exhibits its own dynamics and by reason of that is difficult to manage. It has also been proved that technology and economy are so closely interwoven that they form a power to which nobody is equal (see Chapter 11). This does not mean, however, that engineers and managers are not responsible for the choices they make. The above-mentioned technologies are ethically ambivalent and the people involved can take crucial decisions in many areas. It is therefore good to be aware that the room for action by engineers and managers is limited and that they can therefore not be held accountable for everything that happens to their product. Still, in their own sphere of activity they have a degree of latitude which carries with it a specific responsibility.