ABSTRACT
https://s3-euw1-ap-pe-df-pch-content-public-p.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/9781315699202/0f14be55-dfd9-4c0f-be10-6db7e36ad742/content/fig5_B.tif" xmlns:xlink="https://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"/> In the fall of 1988, this rhymed jingle appeared on a wall in Xi’an: ‘Mao Zedong’s son went to the front. Zhao Ziyang’s son speculates in colour TVs. Deng Xiaoping’s son demands money from everyone’. By the spring of 1989, this little ditty – or variations upon it – could be seen and heard across China. But in 1988, it caught one’s attention. Private, discreet complaining was nothing new in China. Most frequent travellers had heard enough of that over the years. But public attacks on China’s highest leaders were rare. Attacks which compared Deng Xiaoping unfavourably to Mao Zedong were rarer still. In the fall of 1988, trouble was brewing in China, and this wall slogan was not the only indication.
