ABSTRACT
This chapter explores three types of substantive defense against charges that interpretive research is neither rigorous nor objective, definitional-terminological, procedural, and philosophical-conceptual, returning to the rhetorical element at the end. Philosophically, interpretive work rejects the possibility that a human sciences researcher can stand outside the subject of study, which is the very definition of objectivity. Interpretive philosophies reject the human possibility of such social scientific mirroring. The relationship between the understanding of rigor as stepwise and unyielding and of objectivity as physically and emotionally distant, along with extensive attention to the intricacies of tools and techniques, serves to mask underlying aspects of research that are perceived to be problematic. The language of nonreactivity emerges from the concern for epistemological objectivity, the extent to which something about the observer's person might affect those being observed such that they would alter their acts or behavior or words.
