China’s Exceptionalism and the Challenges of Delivering Difference in Africa

Beijing operates a distinctive normative mode in conducting its foreign policy relations with Africa: resting on an historically-informed framework, this is reinforced by contemporary rhetoric emphasising political equality, mutual benefit, sovereignty, non-interference and ‘win-win cooperation’.1 This position has meant that, to date, Chinese diplomacy has officially operated on a different basis from the more overtly hierarchical, prescriptive power relations of established external powers. China’s official approach can be condensed into the notion of ‘exceptionalism’, understood as a term distilling a normative modality of engagement. It is geared toward ensuring ‘mutual benefit’ and ‘win-win’ outcomes at continental and bilateral levels. These principles are not unique as concepts informing the rhetoric of different

external actors in Africa. China’s Africa policy, however, does take particular form in so far as it accentuates a basic but fundamental difference in its relationship with the continent as compared to other actors-notably in a shared history of colonialism and experience as a developing country-while at the same time promoting political principles based on a stronger conception of state sovereignty, non-interference, territorial integrity and political equality. The position of exceptionalism, overall, seeks to structure relations such that though they may remain asymmetrical in economic content, they should remain equal in terms of recognition of economic gains and political standing (mutual respect and equality). This has been the authoritative source of much of China’s engagement with Africa and, concurrently, a bone of contention with various African constituencies, Western governments, donors and NGOs alike, and is contributing to a recasting of Africa’s relationship with the outside world. Yet in projecting ‘exceptionalism’ as a basis for its successful Africa policy, the

Chinese government has introduced a set of challenges arising from this foreign policy of difference, which imposes a considerable burden on Beijing to sustain the unity and coherence of its rhetorical commitments. What follows begins to explore some of the issues that China’s own principles give rise to and to suggest possible ways in which a different perspective on China’s mobilised principles might productively open an alternative interpretative window onto China’s contemporary African relations. Given that China’s African engagement has been too often treated with a problematic combination of assumed linearity-the apparent inexorable expansion of China in Africa-and economic reductionism-ascribing motivations exclusively to resource-diplomacy or material motivation, we aim to present a more conceptually oriented analysis in a manner geared toward stimulating discussion of broader themes. The first section in what follows briefly contextualises current China-Africa relations and the role of ideas in China’s relations with Africa. The notion of ‘exceptionalism’ and the challenges this poses for China is then elaborated upon, followed by an assessment of possible means by which reconciliation might be achieved. Finally we conclude by positing that an alternative variation of ‘neo-modernisation with Chinese characteristics’ is at play in Africa. Four caveats should be noted at the outset. First, this article does not claim to

present a narrowly or in any way rigorous theoretical treatment. However, being conceptually attuned, it seeks to assert the importance of a more serious treatment of the ideational dimensions of China’s foreign policy. It aims, therefore, to introduce another element to the debate on Chinese foreign policy in Africa and not to replace or downplay important material factors.2 Second, while scholarly analysis of ChinaAfrica has become more sophisticated and progressed beyond what was formerly a narrow and frequently binary subject, this paper is not concerned with rehearsing a critique of China; rather, it points to aspects whichmight be considered as arising from these self-generated tensions as well as seeking to rescue China’s rhetoric as received in Africa from the dilemmas and problems of its own making. Third, with respect to the literature on ‘Chinese exceptionalism’ (and, for that matter, of other states): rather

than broaching issues of cultural or racial essentialism, the term here is used only in so far as it delineates a Chinese position characterised by its own proponents as unique to the point of being exceptional both in itself, and in comparison to other external actors in Africa.3 In this light, a subject considered in different ways elsewhere is taken up in the Africa context where key aspects of China’s self-identity and claims made in its ideology-notably China’s position as a great nation, absolute respect for state sovereignty and a foreign policy based on immutable universal principles such as justice and equity rather than expediency-can be said to ‘constitute a claim to entitlement by virtue of China’s ontological status rather than its behavioural characteristics. In effect, they are a demand that others recognize and respect China’s exceptional qualities’.4 Finally, we suggest that prevailingWestern approaches to key areas of debate on contemporary Chinese foreign policy in Africa might be reconsidered in so far as these impose prior narratives and sets of interpretative criteria. Rather than advancing any particular relativist argument, the intent here is to argue for greater interpretative latitude in approaching the official Chinese position that blends fresh energy of the present with ideas and approaches that reprise previous phases of externally-directed development, and multiple attendant tensions, in Africa.

Expansive relations amidst economic uncertainty After decades of obscurity, China’s relations with Africa have become a regular feature of media attention, research and policy engagement.5 This was catalysed by the third Forum for China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in November 2006, which proclaimed ‘the establishment of a new type of strategic partnership between China and Africa featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation’.6 Three aspects of what still remains an emergent relationship are worth noting by way of context. The first is the striking dynamism of China’s relations with Africa.7 This was seen most obviously at a general level in rising China-Africa trade: in 2007 this reached US$73 billion, and in 2008 total trade reached nearly US$107 billion, meaning that the trade target of US$100 billion set at FOCAC III was achieved two years early and China was acclaimed as Africa’s second leading trading partner after the United States, having surpassed France as one of the continent’s key investors. While trade has been affected by the recent global economic downturn, the expansion of a multifaceted Chinese engagement has continued. This is evident in

the expansion of educational and cultural exchanges, emergence of new business areas like financial services (seen in the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China’s US$5.6 billion purchase of a 20% stake in Standard Bank in late 2007), the further development of agricultural cooperation and recalibrated long-term supply agreements for infrastructure, inclusive of other social offsets not seen in earlier Chinese deals with African states. The progress of the US$5 billion Africa Development Fund, overseen by the China Development Bank, has been impeded by such factors as capacity constraints and uncertainty from smaller Chinese businesses about its operations, but is nonetheless set to underwrite substantial investment by Chinese companies in Africa. The rolling out of China’s ‘special economic zones’ pledged in 2006 continues, the first such zones being established in Kitwe (Zambia), Mauritius and Luanda (Angola), with competition to secure the others, even as other China-backed free trade and export processing zones are established independently (including three in Nigeria). Second, the diversity of Chinese actors is increasingly important in shaping official relations by the experiences of ground actors. An overlooked driver of Chinese engagement is that of small and medium sized enterprises engaged in a variety of business activities across Africa. Attention has mostly been directed toward the larger state-owned enterprises, particularly the likes of CNPCC, Sinopec, CNOOC or others engaged in high-profile energy security foreign policy imperatives, and with good reason. However, Africa remains a destination and operating space for a diverse array of Chinese entrepreneurial endeavours, framed as it has been in terms of frontier imagery as the last open continent of strong economic opportunity and potential.8 Third, adaptation on the part of African governments and Beijing has continued. With notable exceptions, officially harmonious state-state relations are nevertheless not immune to political and economic gravity. Investment protection amidst burgeoning economic activities has become more important to Beijing and Chinese companies as part of a changing engagement profile that, broadly speaking, has been in the process of transitioning from an entry/start-up phase into more routine, normalised business relations on the back of these committed investments. In places, notably those resource-rich African states with more developed Chinese investment, this expansion and consolidation of Chinese interests has been accompanied by a process and logic of deepening political involvement. China has thus far put its faith in elite ties and African-led multilateralism to handle issues rising from its deepening engagement but the crosscutting interests of central state, provincial and private actors makes this increasingly difficult to manage, and harder to effectively control. China remains themost important rising force in Africa and its position of enhanced

significance inAfrican affairs appears set to have a sustained impact beyond the shortmedium term.9 However, the exuberant optimism that has accompanied-and in part been engendered by-the apparently inexorable Chinese rise throughout the continent has been tempered in light of global economic change. As China’s economy enters

uncharted waters against the background of wider global economic turbulence, its relations with Africa also face the same reality. The contingencies that have accompanied the thickening of relations ought to be recognised: there is nothing inevitable or preordained about the easy, linear expansion of China’s own domestic development and its relations with Africa likewise. As Wu Bangguo, chairman of the standing committee of the National People’s Congress, reminded the China-Africa Business Cooperation Conference in Cairo in May 2007, China faces its own challenges in sustaining its development.10 This illustrates how the rhetoric of the Chinese government can not only generate raised expectations about China’s relations with developing countries but additionally underlines, in the face of domestic economic and political imperatives, the constrained ability ofChina to contribute to the development of other developing countries. The pressure on China to meet high expectations within Africa as a benevolent development partner, an ‘all weather friend’ that can deliver irrespective of turmoil in international markets, continues.