Edmund Husserl: The Idea of Phenomenology
DOI link for Edmund Husserl: The Idea of Phenomenology
Edmund Husserl: The Idea of Phenomenology book
Russell's conception of knowledge is twofold. First, he defends a version of what one call today a "naturalized epistemology": Knowledge is a natural phenomenon, which can be studied, like anything within nature, in causal terms. Russell's conception of belief is also causal. A belief is the mental state intermediary between environmental inputs and output actions of the organism. This can be understood in a purely behaviourist way, but Russell is not a straight behaviourist. Second, Russell considers that it is impossible to reduce an account of knowledge to an account of the causal relations between an organism and a physical or biological environment. The physicalist point of view is also in need of justification, when it presupposes the naive realism of common sense. As Russell says in what may be one of the most well-known modus ponens of contemporary philosophy: Naive realism leads to physics, and physics, if true, shows that naive realism is false.