ABSTRACT
The majority of virtue theorists have taken their cue from Aristotle. This chapter argues that plausible theory in John Stuart Mill and Julia Driver's work— a theory. It outlines a consequentialist account of epistemic virtue. That account will then be put to use in defining the virtue that is the main object of study: the epistemic virtue of deference. The chapter looks at what informed sources can do to bring about deference, and thereby instill virtues of deference, in light of social psychological evidence on deference and compliance. It refers to as a complementary epistemic virtue of lending an ear that in turn will be related to philosophical work on open-mindedness. The chapter responds to two concerns about the present account to the effect that it sanctions gullibility and is manipulative. It considers a particular epistemic virtue, spelled out in aforementioned, consequentialist terms: the epistemic virtue of deference.
