ABSTRACT
The problem of the value of knowledge results from two solid but unfortunately opposing axiological intuitions. One important advantage of the virtue reliabilist's analysis of knowledge—defended by John Greco and Ernest Sosa—over process-reliabilism is its ability to provide an elegant answer to the three value problems. Solving the problem of the value of knowledge requires explaining why knowledge that p is a better cognitive state than merely believing truly that p, even though knowing that p and merely believing truly that p are on a par as far as their practical value is concerned. Besides offering a solution to the primary and the secondary value problems, virtue reliabilism also solves the tertiary value problem. Sosa's solution to the Jokester objection relies on a distinction between kinds of knowledge. To recap, the recognition of higher forms of knowledge, reflective and full knowledge, offers a way of capturing what is going wrong for the subject in the Jokester case.
