ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on intellectual character—especially on traits deserving to be considered virtues— and explores connections between virtues as traits and individual elements such as beliefs as their manifestations. Epistemology is often characterized as the theory of knowledge, but the field has been concerned with justification as well, and epistemologists continue to theorize about both. Knowledge and justification are importantly related but quite distinct notions. The virtue of reasonableness is quite comprehensive; indeed, ascribed without qualification, it implies action-tendencies and tendencies involving emotion and is far from being entirely intellectual. An intellectual virtue that does not require knowledge as opposed to reasonable belief may still require reliability in the behavioral sense in which reliability is an integrated pattern that has a kind of consistency. The realm of the epistemic has many dimensions, and, correspondingly, the virtues commonly called 'epistemic' may be of more than one kind, and the term 'intellectual' better captures their diversity.
