ABSTRACT
There are various sorts of individuals in biology, and the two most obvious are biological and evolutionary. They share some common physical bases, but are not – in the view I advance here – the same thing. Distinguishing them is not some sort of philosophical parlour game: it is central to evolutionary and ecological analysis, as I shall show. Another way of framing the issue is to ask whether evolution has some sort of explanatory privilege over other aspects of individuality. The question motivating my chapter and Ellen Clarke’s, is, therefore, phrased as: ‘Is evolution fundamental when it comes to defining biological ontology?’ or perhaps more aptly, ‘ Should we give evolution priority when defining biological ontology?’ My answer is ‘No,’ whereas Clarke’s is ‘Yes.’ This is not ontology for its own sake, however. As I (and Clarke) will argue, the point of worrying about ontology is because of the epistemic implications of negative or positive answers.
