ABSTRACT
This chapter provides the conception of 'empathy' has shifted over time, between languages and across disciplines. The mechanism in aesthetics by means of which the viewing subject projects its intentional states into inanimate objects became a mechanism in psychology through which the subject apperceives the intentional states of others. The distinction between 'empathy' and 'sympathy' was blurred in disciplinary transition, mainly due to the fact that psychological objects possess subjective intentionality whereas aesthetic objects, despite appearances, do not. The mechanism of empathy is a lot more complicated than embodied simulation theory would have believe. The chapter describes that embodied simulation is a simple, reflexive mechanism which may well have an indirect relationship with empathy. It discusses the mechanism of empathy proper. Embodied simulation via mirror neurons is an innate capacity of primate brains, and it functions automatically: monkey see, monkey do. Empathy is an acquired capacity. It is better thought of as a developmental achievement.
