ABSTRACT
On March 11, 2011, an enormous tsunami, caused by a massive 8.9-level earthquake, swept through the coastal areas of northeastern Japan. At the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station, four nuclear units suffered serious accidents. This chapter examines the way in which the safety devices failed to work properly to cool the unit cores, as well as analyzes the role of human error in the debacle. Japan's nuclear power program was an important part of its energy policy aimed at maintaining a diversification of energy resources with a stable supply and economic efficiency in mind. The Science and Technology Agency (STA) was an agency established in 1956 with the aim of promoting nuclear power development in the early days of postwar atomic energy. The unique administrative structure characterized by 'government-led private management', and the 'secretariat-led advisory council' system that maneuvered decisions for nuclear regulation in Japan.
