ABSTRACT
But this universal and primary opinion of all men [that “the very images, presented by the senses” are external objects which do not depend “on our perception, but would exist, tho’ we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated”] is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception; [perception,] and that the senses are only the inlets[,] through which these images are received [1777: conveyed], without being ever able [1777: being able] to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object. The table, which we see, [table we see, 1777: table, which we see,] seems to diminish as we remove farther from it: But the real table, which exists[,] independent of us, suffers no alteration. [alteration:] It was[,] therefore[,] nothing but its image[,] which was present to the mind. These are the obvious dictates of reason; and no man[,] who reflects, ever doubted[,] that the existences[,] which we consider, when we say[,] this house, and that tree, are nothing but perceptions in the mind, and fleeting copies and [or] representations of other existences, which remain uniform and independent. [New paragraph.] So far [,] then, we are necessitated, by reasoning, to [are we necessitated by reasoning to] depart from [or contradict, 1777: to contradict or depart from] the primary instincts of nature, and to embrace [and embrace] a new system with regard to the evidence of our senses.4 Prior to offering this argument, Hume had drawn a distinction between ‘the
more trite Topics, employ’d by the Sceptics in all Ages, against the Evidence of Sense;’ and ‘other more profound Arguments against the senses, which admit not of so easy a Solution’ (EHU 12.6). The argument just given is supposed to be an argument of the latter, ‘more profound’ sort. Included among the former ‘topics’ are a number of instances of ‘the Imperfection and Fallaciousness of our Organs, on numberless Occasions’ including the way they present ‘various Aspects of Objects, according to their different Distances’ – which is, oddly, just what the ‘more profound’ argument, quoted above, appeals to.
