ABSTRACT
What holds for beliefs is also true for actions. When one walks leisurely over the Tower Bridge, one has taken for granted that that bridge will hold. In this case what is taken for granted is the truth of the proposition that that bridge will hold. The proposition that is taken for granted, furthermore, is ‘related’ to something else, viz. an action (the action of leisurely walking over the Tower Bridge): it is taken for granted relative to that action. What needs to be the case in order for S, in doing A, to take for granted proposition Q? My suggestion, mirroring my previous one, is this: S, in doing A, takes Q for granted iff
(i) S cannot sensibly do A and deny Q, (ii) even if S believes q, S did not come to do A on the basis of a practical
argument that includes Q among its premises. Clause (i)’s ‘cannot sensibly’ again has a pragmatic twist: if S denies that the Bridge will hold, S cannot sensibly leisurely walk over the Tower Bridge – as no one in his senses will leisurely walk across what he knows is a minefield.
