ABSTRACT
The Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala)2 involved issues related to a state’s right to attribute its nationality by naturalization, the relationship between nationality in municipal and international law, and a state’s obligation to recognize another state’s attribution of nationality and the right of diplomatic protection and international claims. The majority held Liechtenstein’s application inadmissible as Friedrich Nottebohm could not be considered its national for the purposes of international law, preventing the International Court of Justice (hereinafter ‘ICJ’ or ‘Court’) from considering the case’s merits and whether Guatemala had committed wrongful acts against Liechtenstein and Nottebohm. The case is perhaps best known for the criticism that has been levied
against the judgment. Most authors draw its relevance narrowly and qualify its significance as limited due to what has been called ‘unconvincing’ reasoning.3 Weis calls the case’s circumstances ‘quite exceptional’, appending the adage ‘bad cases make bad law’.4 The Court made several sweeping, arguably questionable, pronouncements on the nature of nationality and naturalization, and the case is, however, still frequently cited by authors as indicative of broad rules of international law with respect to nationality.5 Egües, for
example, cites Nottebohm’s definition of nationality to defend Argentina’s attribution of nationality by exercise of option to children born abroad of Argentine parents.6 In Peru, press reports cited the case in relation to former President Alberto Fujimori’s Peruvian nationality following his flight to Japan in 2000 amidst allegations of corruption and human rights violations.7
