Hume on Spatial Properties
DOI link for Hume on Spatial Properties
Hume on Spatial Properties book
This chapter outlines the beginnings of a trope nominalist theory of natural kinds of simple substances and the beginnings of a generalization of the same theory to complex objects. According to the trope nominalist theory, natural kinds are not mind-independent entities but abstractions from natural kind terms with certain determinate application conditions. One of the main reasons to postulate tropes is to answer the contemporary problem of universals. The chapter deals against the rival nominalist attempt to identify natural kinds with any mind-independent entity or with groups of mind-independent entities. It discusses three different kinds of cases: first, the primary kinds, or, the most specific natural kinds necessary to a simple substance, second, the contingent natural kinds more specific than the primary kinds, and third, more general natural kinds than the primary kinds. The most developed recent metaphysical theories of substantial natural kinds are all in the realist camp: the neo-Aristotelian theories identify natural kinds with substantial kind universals.