ABSTRACT
The impacts of the crisis on the quality of life in Greek cities All of the above changes radically amended the quality of life in Greek cities. People, trying to adapt themselves to the altered circumstances, have to deal with the imposed pay cuts, dismissals, and a generalised impoverishment in the absence of supporting networks. In addition, the current lack of state capital decreases the state capacity to receive unregulated immigrants from other countries. This adds to the already high unemployment rates of the country intensifying the social and economic problems already caused by the meltdown. In an effort to examine practically the impacts of the credit crunch on the regional level, the GDP (gross domestic product) index course through time will be taken into consideration as this provides credible information about the quality of life in different areas of Greece. However, GDP cannot be analysed in isolation but we should also consider the consumption expenditure, the income distribution, the unemployment trends, and poverty rates, the study of which can provide useful inputs. It is a fact that there is a notable interrelation between economy and space (Figure 10.1). The two metropolitan regions of Attiki and Thessaloniki, that include the two biggest cities of Greece, show by far the highest values of GDP index, in comparison to the rest of the country. It is of particular interest that the existing difference has widened even more between 2008 and 2012, revealing the increasing internal imbalances within the country. To this point, it is worth mentioning that, except Athens and Thessaloniki, the other regions’ GDP does
not show extensive discrepancies, making these seem more defenceless to the urban crisis compared to the latter. Unfortunately, data for consumption expenditure on the city level does not exist. However, substantial conclusions can be drawn if the evolution of expenditure differences between urban and rural areas is examined (see Figure 10.2). In 2009 the average difference in expenditure was 32.7 per cent. In 2013 it could be observed that the gap between the two groups decreased up to 21.6 per cent. This is the result of the decline in expenditure in urban areas by 28.6 per cent, from €2.232 per month in 2009 to €1.595 per month in 2013. In the same period expenditure in rural areas fell by 16.8 per cent to €1.250. Examining the economic perspective, there has been a constant decrease in consumption expenditure. The Hellenic Statistical Authority (EL.STAT, 2014a; see also Figure 10.3) monitoring the income and expenditure patterns of Greek
households nationwide recorded a decrease of 31.5 per cent (at constant prices) of the average monthly expenditure between 2009 and 2013. Between 2012 and 2013 there is a notable change in the consumption patterns (in current prices) of Greek households. The shift is mostly related to a considerable cut in expenses in transport, durable goods, housing, hotels, cafés and restaurants, services, education, and communications whereas expenses related mainly to health and medication, alcoholic drinks, tobacco, and nutrition are changing in a lower rate as a percentage of the family budgets (EL.STAT, 2014a; see also Figure 10.4). Analysing the changes between 2009 and 2013, there is a clear trend in declining expenses in all categories. However, the biggest decrease is noted in clothing, durable goods, and cafés and restaurants. In the contrary, the smallest decrease can be observed in alcoholic drinks, housing, and nutrition (EL.STAT, 2014a; see also Figure 10.5). When looking at the distribution of total income in the different households, a generalised impoverishment of the population could not be noticed. Figure 10.6 illustrates the income quartiles. It seems that the crisis does not present a differentiating factor regarding income distribution. Taking into account also the development of the Gini Index, as a popular tool that is frequently used to measure income inequality as one number (Shkolnikov, Andreev, & Begun, 2003), between 2009 and 2013, it could be noticed that Greece remains a highly polarised country, but the crisis has not contributed to a significant change in either direction (see Figure 10.7). However possible different findings arise when considering the portion of the population at risk of poverty or social exclusion by age group. By definition, poverty risk is defined as the percentage of people living in households where the total equalised disposable income is below 60 per cent of the national median income (Eurostat, 2015). However, it should be borne in mind that specific population groups which are presumably poor, like homeless people, illegal economic migrants, Roma, etc., are not included in the survey. In Greece in 2009 almost
one-third of the population was regarded as population at risk of poverty. It seems that the crisis has contributed to a steep rise in the percentages, especially for specific age groups, such as children and population aged between 18 and 64 (see also Figure 10.8). Other useful findings for the degradation of lifestyle may be made when studying the trend in the unemployment rate. Greece can be an interesting case study as unemployment has soared in cities, regardless of the community and national funds raised to this purpose, such as subsidy programmes for enterprises and unemployed people. Over time, unfortunately, job opportunities in Greece
are not at all ameliorated; unemployment is constantly growing, without providing room to boost the local economy (see Figure 10.9). Although the most obvious reasons for the rise of unemployment seem to be the austerity measures applied in the course of the economic crisis, others are to be found also in a variety of chronic dysfunctions in the state structure. The Greek labour market cannot any more provide high-productivity jobs while the education system produces high-skilled and overqualified people, demonstrating
that the skills developed are different from the skills demanded. This mismatch reveals the lack of an effective strategic planning that the state should implement in order to structure properly qualified society regardless of the ongoing financial crisis. To this point, attention should be drawn to the dual nature of the concerns, both economic and social ones (Monastiriotis & Martelli, 2013), that are raised by the high rates of unemployment and that require an immediate policy mobilisation. Referring to the current credit crunch and its social impacts in the cities, we further have to consider immigration trends, although they are not covered by statistics on income inequalities or poverty. The geographical position of the country, the current turmoil in the Middle East, and the inefficient border control provide preconditions for the receiving of such numerous groups of immigrants. Up until 2008, the ‘foreign population’ that arrived in the country, contributed to the population increase and served the employment needs of the seasonal industries such as agriculture and tourism. Since then, these population groups have been treated as a threat (Mediterranean Migration Observatory, 2004). Nowadays, the unauthorised entry of migrants from Africa and Asia raises the portion of undocumented expatriates and makes cities, especially on Greek islands, experience economic and cultural awe. In addition, the state remains incapable of implementing a succinct integration policy and has not sufficient infrastructure to take care of this new population (Triandafyllidou, 2014). In this way, the lack of efficient policies and the bureaucracy in deportation procedures have led to both sides’ dissatisfaction. On the one hand, immigrants cannot resort to an immediate exodus and, on the other hand, Greek society’s cohesion is threatened. Regarding this, it should be pointed out that the extent of this problem was the main reason for the rise of the ultra-right party of Golden Dawn. This party focused on racism, xenophobia, and the stranded feeling of security, trying to persuade voters by promoting a stricter policy towards foreign population. Also
many conservative political groups have focused on anti-immigrant campaigns, ignoring any positive influences these foreign groups may bring to the country (Ellinas, 2013). The shocking depravity of the country’s issues found its expression in the results from the last national elections. The population, drained economically and mentally by austerity, in an effort to defend a decent quality of life, was attracted by the left-wing government of Syriza for the very first time in Greek political history. Greek people were totally convinced by the anti-austerity argument of Syriza, supporting his approach of setting in question the ‘over-valued’, according to them, Greek debt (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2015). Since 2008, recession has been continuous and is still evolving. The changes that occurred as a result of the crisis in the political, economic, and social system of the country and finally in the production model itself have led to a radical deconstruction of the traditional model of business development and living conditions that prevailed in various versions since the post-war era and the dictatorship (Psycharis, 2011). The degradation is manifested in two ways. First, indirectly, by the depreciation of small and medium entrepreneurship and property that were once the pillars of Greek economic development and, second, directly by the systematic promotion of a new business model, that until at least the election of Syriza to government, has been radically diverging from the traditional model of the Greek ‘compact capitalism’. Employment prospects in the public sector, lending, as well as income from subsidies and tax exemptions, had orientated households in channelling much of the rising income in the purchase of land and property as a form of investment. The new model is based on the use of large public or private land, mainly in the form of organised receptors for residential and business activities; gradually devaluing the traditional small Greek construction companies (Giannakourou & Kafkalas, 2014). From now on, political decisions will show if Syriza will be able to implement immediate measures, trust local people, respect the lenders, and improve state organisation structures. Against the background of the conducted analysis it could be concluded that quality of life is entwined with economic prosperity in Greek cities. Unemployment and risk of poverty affect directly the life of people, excluding them from any social and professional activities. Differences between urban and rural areas, as well as between urban areas themselves, are key points of an underlying spatial differentiation in Greece. Prior key characteristics of the system, such as a high percentage of self-employed people and high homeownership, were immediately affected by the crisis and created a new economic and social environment that was not in a position to deal with the acute consequences of the crisis. Previous structural problems as well as considerable underestimation of strategic planning and policies, combined with poor social welfare provisions, were only enhanced by the crisis (Kotios, Galanos, & Roukanas, 2012). The retraction of the social welfare state, in combination with the inability of the traditional Greek supporting network, mainly family and friends, because of their own vulnerable position, brought up other types of supporting networks (Sotiropoulos & Bourikos, 2014). The volunteer networks that have emerged are
organised in an informal way and cover various fields of the social welfare provisions, ranging from providing shelter and food to people in need, to establishing infirmaries, pharmacies, or supporting centres for families. The question is how spatial policies are to address the issues discussed. The deterioration of living conditions and quality of life in general is affecting all levels of administration. However in most cases the key responsibility for confronting the immediate effects of the crisis remains within the limits of regional authorities. Their limited resources however do not provide a sustainable framework for enhancing the quality of life, as the focus is restricted to damage control actions such as maintenance, while in the meantime new plans are abandoned. From this perspective, it remains questionable whether the crisis will allow spatial planning to fulfil its basic aims as described in the following section or not.
