ABSTRACT
Introduction The relationships between Norway and Iceland and the EU represent a puzzle. While the Norwegian political elite has made several attempts at joining the European project, its electorate has rejected EU membership on two occasions. The vast majority of the Icelandic political elite remain highly sceptical towards the issue of EU membership, while most Icelanders want to explore the membership option. Meanwhile, the countries are highly integrated into the European project through their membership of the EU’s most extensive external agreements, the agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA) and the Schengen Agreement. Iceland, which decided to stand on its own and not follow the other Nordic states in their quest for EU membership in the early 1990s, submitted a membership application nine months after the economic crash of 2008. The Icelandic government that took office in May 2013 put its application on hold, unexpectedly tabling a resolution for the Icelandic national parliament, the Althingi, to quit the accession process altogether in February 2014. At the same time, it is trying to find ways to associate itself with the upcoming free trade negotiations between the EU and the United States. The Norwegian elite is eager to implement most (approximately three-quarters) of the EU’s legislative acts (EEA Review Committee 2012b: 3) into Norwegian legislation in connection with the EEA. The aim of the new Norwegian government that took office in October 2013 is to pursue a more active European policy than its predecessor, although it regards participation in Norway’s existing agreements with the EU as the basis of its activities in this direction. Norwegian voters are holding the pro-European elite back from applying yet again for EU membership. This chapter tries to explain this picture which, to put it mildly, is baffling. It describes the involvement of Norway and Iceland in the European project. The intention is to explore why these two countries, positioned in the north-western edge of Europe, have taken the view that EU membership would impose greater constraints on them than partial engagement. The chapter opens with an historical overview of the development of their respective relationships with the EU. The second and third sections address the phenomenon of Euroscepticism among both the political elite and the voters. These sections attempt to answer why the
countries have not followed the other Nordic states and joined the Union. The final section summarises the main findings and discusses whether the states will be bound to remain outside of the EU in the near future.
