ABSTRACT
Introduction: small states and their best friend The European Commission (hereafter known as the Commission) is a key player in EU politics. It holds the right of initiative, proposing all new legislation decided upon in the EU. As the ‘defender of the treaties’, it plays an important role in overseeing how member states implement the acquis. And for many years, the Commission has been considered the best friend of small member states due to its role as the defender of the common interest (cf. Antola and Lehtimäki 2001: 28-9; Bunse, Magnette and Nicolaïdis 2005: 12-15; Geurts 1998).1 While the Commission has been declared in ‘decline’ compared to other EU institutions for some years, it remains an immensely powerful institution (Kurpas, Grøn and Kaczynski 2008: 3). Due to its role as the defender of the common interest, the Commission is independent of national interests. Commissioners do not formally represent their member states once they take office, but rather the portfolio they are given (Buonanno and Nugent 2013: 42). Commission employees are supposed to be loyal to the institution and the EU as such – not their country of origin. And Commission employees at all levels are expected to listen to national interests but to draft new legislation with a view to the interests of the entire EU (art. 11 of staff regulations; EUR-Lex 2014). Despite this formal regulation of the Commission, member states continue to pursue formal and informal strategies in their attempts to influence the Commission. Member states are interested in interacting with the Commission because it holds the right of initiative. In an enlarged EU, small member states must think beyond influencing legislation in the Council of Ministers (Council) negotiations (Grøn and Wivel 2011). This is partly due to their limited number of votes. It has also become increasingly difficult to change written proposals in Council negotiations (Bouwen 2009: 25), not least for smaller member states who consistently observe consensus norms in Council negotiations more seriously than do larger countries (Antola and Lehtimäki 2001: 72; Heisenberg 2005: 77; Mattila 2004; Thorhallsson and Wivel 2006: 661). The current EU set-up underlines the importance for member states to influence the Commission, but the Commission also has clear interests in hearing what member states have to say.
