ABSTRACT
Introduction In a volume examining the relationship between the Nordic states and the European Union (EU), it is appropriate to include a chapter focusing on the Nordic parliaments. These states are commonly thought of not only as particularly strong parliamentary democracies but also, more specifically, as exemplars of a particularly robust form of the parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs, sometimes referred to as a distinct ‘Nordic model’. Here, their similarities largely outweigh their differences, especially in comparison to the other EU member states. Hence this is an example of a most-similar-cases comparison. However, if we compare the direct involvement of the Nordic parliaments at the EU level as distinct from the scrutiny of their respective governments, important differences emerge. The contrast becomes most apparent in their varying approaches to the Early Warning Mechanism (EWM), a new procedure under the Treaty of Lisbon which has empowered national parliaments to intervene directly in the EU’s legislative process. This chapter will compare the involvement of these parliaments with the EU with a particular focus on their response to one controversial EU legislative proposal (the 2012 Monti II regulation), which was seen as threatening the Nordic social model of industrial relations; in that case, the early objections of the Danish, Swedish and Finnish parliaments contributed to the proposal’s swift demise. The chapter begins with an overview of the numerous historical similarities between the Nordic parliaments with respect to their scrutiny of EU affairs before demonstrating the differences between them in their engagement with their new powers under the Treaty of Lisbon, including the EWM. Then, after a brief explanation of the Monti II proposal and its fate under the EWM, an analysis comparing the Nordic parliaments’ varied responses to it reveals their differing roles and attitudes with respect to interparliamentary cooperation. The Danish Folketing (parliament of Denmark), led by its powerful European Affairs Committee (EAC), played the role of strategic coordinator in this case, organising opposition among national parliaments against Monti II. The Swedish Riksdag (national legislature of Sweden), reflecting the fact that its EWM-related tasks are largely devolved to sectoral committees, is a comprehensive scrutiniser
with the capacity to monitor all EU legislative proposals, but less of a propensity to prioritise among them or to engage in interparliamentary cooperation. The Finnish Eduskunta (parliament of Finland) is a reluctant cooperator due to its prevailing conviction that its essential task, delegated to the EAC, is to exercise robust oversight of the government’s conduct of EU affairs but not to engage directly at the EU level or through interparliamentary cooperation. Lastly, the Norwegian Storting (parliament of Norway) has the ambiguous role of outsideinsider, partly included and partly excluded from the various EU interparliamentary forums, reflecting how Norway is closely associated with, but not a member of, the EU. The chapter ends with a brief conclusion.
