ABSTRACT
Virtue epistemology (hereafter VE) refers to a variety of accounts about epistemic virtue and its relevance to knowledge. However, there is a minimal, propositional common ground underlying all such approaches: (1) attributing or acquiring knowledge presupposes the manifestation of epistemic virtues in the knower; (2) epistemic concepts are normative and can fully be investigated within a vocabulary of standards, values, even duties; and (3) instead of focusing on the epistemic status of beliefs and propositions, epistemologists should shift their attention to the evaluation of epistemic agents (Sosa 1980, 1991; Montmarquet 1987; Code 1987; Kvanvig 1992; Zagzebski 1996; Greco 2002; Kawall 2002; Roberts & Wood 2007). The main question for virtue epistemology is: What does it mean to be a reliable and/or responsible knower?
